Monitors network to actively remediate unauthorized activities. Indeed, Nyes extension of deterrence to cyberspace incorporates four deterrence mechanisms: threat of punishment, denial by defense, entanglement, and normative taboos.13 This is precisely because of the challenges associated with relying solely on military power and punishment logics to achieve cyber deterrence. The second most common architecture is the control system network as a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) off the business LAN (see Figure 4). This has led to a critical gap in strategic thinkingnamely, the cross-domain implications of cyber vulnerabilities and adversary cyber operations in day-to-day competition for deterrence and warfighting above the level of armed conflict. The business LAN is protected from the Internet by a firewall and the control system LAN is protected from the business LAN by a separate firewall. Given the potentially high consequences of cyber threats to NC3 and NLCC, priority should be assigned to identifying threats to these networks and systems, and threat-hunting should recur with a frequency commensurate with the risk and consequences of compromise. The attacker must know how to speak the RTU protocol to control the RTU. 3 (2017), 454455. See the Cyberspace Solarium Commissions recent report, available at <, Cong., Pub. Scholars and practitioners in the area of cyber strategy and conflict focus on two key strategic imperatives for the United States: first, to maintain and strengthen the current deterrence of cyberattacks of significant consequence; and second, to reverse the tide of malicious behavior that may not rise to a level of armed attack but nevertheless has cumulative strategic implications as part of adversary campaigns. DODIG-2019-106 (Washington, DC: DOD, July 26, 2019), 2, available at . To understand the vulnerabilities associated with control systems you must know the types of communications and operations associated with the control system as well as have an understanding of the how attackers are using the system vulnerabilities to their advantage. 13 Nye, Deterrence and Dissuasion, 5455. Within the Intelligence Community, the National Counterintelligence and Security Center within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence also plays a role in supply chain security through its counterintelligence mission, which includes the defense industrial base. The HMI provides graphical displays for presentation of status of devices, alarms and events, system health, and other information relevant to the system. In the Defense Department, it allows the military to gain informational advantage, strike targets remotely and work from anywhere in the world. 32 Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, Thermonuclear Cyberwar, Journal of Cybersecurity 3, no. Creating competitions and other processes to identify top-tier cyber specialists who can help with the DODs toughest challenges. 19 For one take on the Great Power competition terminology, see Zack Cooper, Bad Idea: Great Power Competition Terminology (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 1, 2020), available at . cyber vulnerabilities to dod systems may include On May 20, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) posted a request for information (RFI) for cyber vulnerability services. To strengthen congressional oversight and drive continued progress and attention toward these issues, the requirement to conduct periodic vulnerability assessments should also include an after-action report that includes current and planned efforts to address cyber vulnerabilities of interdependent and networked weapons systems in broader mission areas, with an intent to gain mission assurance of these platforms. 31 Jacquelyn G. Schneider, Deterrence in and Through Cyberspace, in Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity, ed. In the case of WannaCry, the ransomware possessed the ability to infect entire connected networks from the entry point of a single vulnerable computer meaning that one vulnerability was enough to paralyze the entire system. 5 (2014), 977. warnings were so common that operators were desensitized to them.46 Existing testing programs are simply too limited to enable DOD to have a complete understanding of weapons system vulnerabilities, which is compounded by a shortage of skilled penetration testers.47. If cybersecurity requirements are tacked on late in the process, or after a weapons system has already been deployed, the requirements are far more difficult and costly to address and much less likely to succeed.53 In 2016, DOD updated the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement (DFARS), establishing cybersecurity requirements for defense contractors based on standards set by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Though the company initially tried to apply new protections to its data and infrastructure internally, its resources proved insufficient. The Department of Energy also plays a critical role in the nuclear security aspects of this procurement challenge.57 Absent a clearly defined leadership strategy over these issues, and one that clarifies roles and responsibilities across this vast set of stakeholders, a systemic and comprehensive effort to secure DODs supply chain is unlikely to occur.58. A typical network architecture is shown in Figure 2. large versionFigure 2: Typical two-firewall network architecture. (Sood A.K. This discussion provides a high level overview of these topics but does not discuss detailed exploits used by attackers to accomplish intrusion. 10 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2004), 26. Defense Acquisition Regulations System, Attn: Ms. Kimberly Ziegler, OUSD(A&S)DPC(DARS), 3060 . malware implantation) to permit remote access. 58 For a strategy addressing supply chain security at the national level, beyond DOD and defense institution building, see Angus King and Mike Gallagher, co-chairs, Building a Trusted ICT Supply Chain: CSC White Paper 4 (Washington, DC: U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission, October 2020), available at . Research in vulnerability analysis aims to improve ways of discovering vulnerabilities and making them public to prevent attackers from exploiting them. Simply put, ensuring your systems are compliant, and setting up control in place are often the best efforts a company can make to protect its systems from cyberattacks. Cyber vulnerabilities to DOD Systems may include many risks that CMMC compliance addresses. Adversaries studied the American way of war and began investing in capabilities that targeted our strengths and sought to exploit perceived weaknesses.21 In this new environment, cyberspace is a decisive arena in broader GPC, with significant implications for cross-domain deterrence.22, The literature on the feasibility of deterrence in cyberspace largely focuses on within-domain deterrencein other words, the utility and feasibility of using (or threatening) cyber means to deter cyber behavior.23 Scholars have identified a number of important impediments to this form of cyber deterrence.24 For instance, the challenges of discerning timely and accurate attribution could weaken cyber deterrence through generating doubt about the identity of the perpetrator of a cyberattack, which undermines the credibility of response options.25 Uncertainty about the effects of cyber capabilitiesboth anticipating them ex ante and measuring them ex postmay impede battle damage assessments that are essential for any deterrence calculus.26 This uncertainty is further complicated by limitations in the ability to hold targets at risk or deliver effects repeatedly over time.27 A deterring state may avoid revealing capabilities (which enhances the credibility of deterrence) because the act of revealing them renders the capabilities impotent.28 Finally, the target may simply not perceive the threatened cyber costs to be sufficiently high to affect its calculus, or the target may be willing to gamble that a threatened action may not produce the effect intended by the deterring state due to the often unpredictable and fleeting nature of cyber operations and effects.29 Others offer a more sanguine take. Nikolaos Pissanidis, Henry Roigas, and Matthijs Veenendaal (Tallinn: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2016), 194, available at <, https://www.ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/Art-12-Weapons-Systems-and-Cyber-Security-A-Challenging-Union.pdf, Weapon Systems Cybersecurity: DOD Just Beginning to Grapple with Scale of Vulnerabilities, , GAO-19-128 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2018), available at <, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-128.pdf, Lubold and Volz, Navy, Industry Partners Are Under Cyber Siege.. Army Gen. Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently told the Defense Media Activity the private sector's cyber vulnerabilities also threaten national security because the military depends on commercial networks. All of the above a. Encuentro Cuerpo Consular de Latinoamerica - Mesa de Concertacin MHLA . Art, To What Ends Military Power? International Security 4, no. To support a strategy of full-spectrum deterrence, the United States must maintain credible and capable conventional and nuclear capabilities. The target must believe that the deterring state has both the capabilities to inflict the threatening costs and the resolve to carry out a threat.14 A deterring state must therefore develop mechanisms for signaling credibility to the target.15 Much of the Cold War deterrence literature focused on the question of how to convey resolve, primarily because the threat to use nuclear weaponsparticularly in support of extended deterrence guarantees to allieslacks inherent credibility given the extraordinarily high consequences of nuclear weapons employment in comparison to any political objective.16 This raises questions about decisionmakers willingness to follow through on a nuclear threat. However, the credibility conundrum manifests itself differently today. 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